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Abstract 
In many historical episodes, the extent of criminal activity has displayed booms and busts. One 
very clear example is the case of metal crime, where in the face of big increases in value driven 
by world commodity prices, the incidence of metal thefts in the UK (and elsewhere) rose very 
sharply in the 2000s. Early in the current decade, they fell sharply again. This paper studies the 
roles of prices, policing and policy in explaining these crime dynamics. The empirical analysis 
shows sizeable and significant metal crime-price elasticities, in line with the idea that changing 
economic returns do shape crime. However, the rapid upward and downward trends are not 
only due to price changes. Their temporal evolution is also explained by changes in policing 
and policy. On the former, a difference-in-differences approach is used to document an 
important role of policing as a consequence of an anti-metal crime operation introduced in 2012. 
On the latter, the introduction of the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013 is exploited to study the 
impact of policy on the economic activity of scrap metal dealers in England and Wales. Results 
from our difference-in-differences specification suggest that the tougher regulatory system 
introduced by the policy hindered the economic activity of pre-existing dealers, reflecting the 
reduced market size for potential metal criminals to sell what they have stolen. 
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1. Introduction 
In many historical episodes, the extent of criminal activity has displayed booms and busts. One 
recent, very clear, example of this has been the case of metal crime. Big increases in commodity 
prices, in particular in the prices of metals, occurred worldwide in the 2000s. This substantively 
increased metal values, and in line with the first order predictions of economic models where 
the economic returns to crime matter for people’s decisions on whether or not to engage in 
crime (Becker, 1968, Ehrlich, 1973, 1996), there were spectacular increases in metal crimes in 
many places.1 Empirical study has revealed sizeable metal crime-price elasticities in London in 
this wave of metal crime (Draca et al., 2015). 
However, as with other (crime) booms, a bust has followed this, at least in the context 
of the UK. Metal theft has fallen very rapidly since near the start of the current decade. 
Generating an understanding of the reasons for such a marked boom and bust is an important 
research question in the economics of crime field. The UK setting offers a particularly good 
testing ground, first because of the scale of the crime changes, and second because these big 
magnitudes generated policing and policy responses that we are able to analyse as quasi-
experiments that can potentially affect crime.  
The metal crime dynamics embodied in the boom and bust are studied to more generally 
consider how crime rises due to economic incentives and falls due to policing, legislation and 
technology interventions. Examples of technology interventions that deterred crime in recent 
years include the ‘electronic engine immobilisers’ for cars, the ‘Find your IPhone’ application 
for smartphones and the ‘chip and pin’ technology for credit cards. The metal crime boom and 
                                                            
1 Examples from recent years include the theft of more than 700 meters of iron from the Longfellow Bridge in 
Boston in 2008, the theft of power transmission wires that caused a four-hour power outage in Canada in 2011, 
and the theft of a 10-ton bridge in Czech Republic in 2012 (see, respectively: 
http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2008/09/12/case_of_the_purloined_ironwork/; 
http://www.thepeterboroughexaminer.com/2011/09/01/power-outage-north-of-city-caused-by-wire-theft; and 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/9235705/Czech-metal-thieves-dismantle-10-ton-
bridge.html). 
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bust in England and Wales that is studied is one extreme example of how economic incentives, 
policing and policy can shape crime dynamics. 
Over and above the boom and bust, metal theft is a particularly useful crime to study in 
economic research for several reasons.2 First, from a purely economic perspective, one defining 
characteristic of metal crimes is their motivation for the prospective criminal. Whereas other 
property items are generally stolen for their extrinsic value, items involved in metal theft are 
stolen for their intrinsic value as raw material or commodities. Indeed, these thefts often have 
negative externalities much greater than the value of the metal stolen, such as the destruction 
of valuable statues, power interruptions, and the disruption of railway traffic. Additional 
indirect costs generated by metal theft, e.g., in the forms of extra-insurance, are also estimated 
to be in the order of several millions of British pounds every year.3 Second, there is a liquid 
market, and public market prices for both new and scrap metal. Third, much of the price 
fluctuations seen in the 2000s was driven by the rapid economic development of China that has 
increased its demand for the metals, with copper being a striking case in point. Therefore, in all 
likelihood, the extraordinary increase in prices for some of those (scrap) metals provided an 
economic incentive to steal more metal from the railway network, other utilities and beyond. 
 The big rises and big falls in metal crimes seen in the UK form the focus of this paper. 
The objective, however, is to study a more general empirical connection between crime and 
prices, crime and police intervention, as well as crime and policy, and to evaluate their 
respective roles in explaining the boom and bust that is embodied in crime dynamics. 
                                                            
2 Metal crime refers to thefts of items for the value of their constituent metals, rather than the acquisition of the 
item. Apart from precious metals like gold and silver, the metals most commonly stolen are non-ferrous metals 
such as copper, lead, aluminium, brass, and bronze. However, even cast iron and steel have experienced higher 
rates of theft which coincided with increased scrap metal prices. 
3 As an example, the insurance cost for the Church of England hit approximately £10 million pounds in 2011 as a 
result of metal theft (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/9126648/Metal-theft-costs-Church-of-
England-10-million.html). 
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The empirical analysis starts by examining whether the changing prices of metals affect 
the level of crime over time. To do so, monthly-level British Transport Police (BTP) microdata 
on the count of metal crime incidents in England and Wales between January 2007 and 
December 2015 were utilised. A similar exercise was carried out using data in London from the 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), on monthly counts of metal theft in the region covered by 
the MPS. These data were combined with data on local scrap metal prices in the UK collected 
from www.letsrecycle.com and with data on international metal prices from the online platform 
“Index Mundi”. Sizeable crime-price elasticities emerge from this analysis, reporting a strong 
sensitivity of metal crimes to scrap metal prices, including instrumental variable (IV) estimates 
where the exogenous variation in the world commodity prices is utilised. 
The second and third parts of the empirical analysis are motivated by the fact that, by 
2011, the scale of metal theft in the UK had reached unprecedented levels.4 As a response, the 
BTP introduced an anti-metal crime policy - “Operation Tornado” – that was trialled across the 
police forces of Northumbria, Durham and Cleveland in early 2012. The UK government also 
responded by introducing the Scrap Metal Dealers Act of 2013, which was implemented in 
October 2013. Whether these policing and policy interventions affected the path of metal crime 
is therefore studied. 
The second main part of the empirical analysis focuses on the impact of policing on 
metal theft. This analysis exploits exogenous variation in the intensity of policing across a panel 
of police force areas induced by a novel initiative of the BTP, called Operation Tornado (OT). 
Since OT was piloted in January 2012 in the North East, and then extended to all other regions 
in England and Wales by September 2012, a difference-in-differences specification is defined 
whereby late adopters of OT are used as controls for the early adopters. The high frequency of 
the data allows us to exploit a time window between January and September 2012 to identify 
                                                            
4 Figure A1 in the Appendix shows that media coverage of metal theft on UK National Newspapers increased 
dramatically in 2011 and 2012 from previous years, and it returned to the pre-2011 levels from 2013 until today. 
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the impact of OT on metal theft incidence in England and Wales. For this analysis, microdata 
from the BTP were aggregated up at the police force area level with monthly frequency.5  
The paper then moves on to study the third question, namely what was the impact of the 
Scrap Metal Dealers Act (SMDA) 2013 on the economic activity of Scrap Metal Dealers 
(SMDs) in England and Wales. The SMDA 2013 came into force in October 2013 and it 
superseded the SMDA of 1964. Amongst other things, the SMDA 2013 introduced new 
provisions for the issuance and revocation of a scrap metal licence, for the verification of scrap 
metal suppliers’ identities and it introduced the offence of buying scrap metal for cash. By 
regulating the economic activity of SMDs, this policy intervention de facto increased the risk 
of being apprehended and punished for selling stolen metal to SMDs. This part of the paper 
utilises a panel of firm-level data from the Fame database and it exploits variation across firms 
in the intensity of exposure to the provisions of the SMDA 2013. A difference-in-differences 
specification is defined comparing the economic activity of SMDs with the economic activity 
of pawnshops and other firms involved in the collection of non-hazardous waste, in the recovery 
of sorted materials, in the wholesale of metals and metal ores, and in the wholesale of waste. 
The results show that, following the SMDA 2013, SMDs in England and Wales experienced a 
significant reduction in their turnover, turnover per employee and EBITDA margin. This 
suggests that the stricter regulation regime under the SMDA 2013 decreased the potential for 
metal thieves to sell stolen metal to these businesses. This is a relevant finding not only for the 
market of metals, as lessons can be learnt also on the likely crime-reduction effects of stricter 
regulation in other industries, such as for cars, smartphones and credit cards. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the aggregate 
time series data, offer some descriptive analysis and present some metal crime-price elasticities. 
                                                            
5 Morgan et al. (2015) constitute an early attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of Operation Tornado in reducing 
metal theft. However, from their analysis, it is impossible to separate out the impact of Operation Tornado on 
metal theft from the impact of the Scrap Metal Dealers Act (2013) and additional related interventions on metal 
theft. 
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Section 3 shows the statistical results on policing and metal crimes using a police force area 
panel, and Section 4 presents the results of the firm-level analysis of how specific legislation 
affected SMDs. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Metal Crime and Prices 
The empirical analysis begins with an investigation of the impact of metal prices on the 
incidence of metal theft. In the analysis of the determinants of metal theft, this seems as a natural 
starting point since prices represent the direct benefit from engagement in property crime. In 
this case (unlike for other prices, like some of the consumer goods studied in Draca et al., 2015) 
the resale price is likely to be the actual price when selling on to a scrap metal merchant. In the 
case of metal theft, these prices (e.g. for copper, lead or aluminium) are largely determined on 
international commodity markets and, thus, the exogenous nature of international metal prices 
allows us to identify the causal impact of changes in scrap metal prices on crime.  
 Only a few studies have investigated the impact of prices on crime. Using British data, 
Reilly and Witt (2008) show that the fall in the real price of audio-visual goods led to a reduction 
in domestic burglary. D’Este (2014) presents evidence from the US on the positive link between 
the size of the local market for the trade of stolen property and the responsiveness of burglars 
to changes in prices. In particular, he shows that the predetermined stock of pawnshops within 
a county increases the consequences of variations in gold prices for burglaries. Draca et al. 
(2015) use data from the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) of London to present evidence of 
significant positive crime-price elasticities for a panel of 44 consumer goods and for commodity 
related goods (jewellery, fuel and metal crimes). Draca (2016) also points to the role of prices 
in explaining the fall in crime in the UK since the early 1990s. Braakmann et al. (2017) show 
that increases in the price of gold lead to disproportionate increases in property crime in 
neighbourhoods in the UK with a large share of South Asian population; due to the perception 
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that South Asians keep a substantial amount of gold in their properties, the return to property 
crime increases in these neighbourhoods when the price of gold rises (Braakmann et al., 2017). 
In criminology, there are a number of case studies that focused on goods such as copper cable 
(Sidebottom et al., 2011; and Sidebottom, Ashby, and Johnson, 2014), electrical equipment 
(Wellsmith and Burrell, 2005) and livestock (Sidebottom, 2013). 
This section of the paper sets up an empirical framework to study the role of prices in 
the metal theft boom and bust. First, metal crime-price elasticities are estimated using different 
data sources. Then the robustness of the estimated metal crime-price elasticities to the inclusion 
of additional variables, notably male unemployment to reflect labour market incentives and 
lagged metal theft to model crime dynamics, is appraised.  
Data and Research Design 
 For this analysis, information on metal theft is derived from two data sources. The first 
is the administrative dataset of criminal offences of the British Transport Police (BTP). This 
dataset contains detailed information on all crimes recorded by the BTP from January 2007 
until December 2015. Among all the categories of crime recorded, it includes information on 
metal theft and scrap metal dealer offences. It reports detailed information on the precise nature, 
time (i.e., hour and date) and location (i.e., latitude and longitude) of each crime incident. The 
BTP data covers the regions of England, Wales and Scotland. In total, it contains detailed 
information on 940,227 crime incidents that occurred in these regions from January 2007 to 
December 2015 and that were recorded by the BTP.  
 The empirical analysis also uses data on metal theft from the administrative records of 
the Crime Record Information System (CRIS) of the MPS. The CRIS contains information on 
the type and count of metal stolen in thefts, burglaries and robberies. It constitutes the standard 
crime recording system of the MPS, with stolen properties grouped by type at the two-digit 
level. The CRIS provides metal theft records separately for seven categories of metal, namely 
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gold, silver, copper, lead, brass, aluminium and a residual group of other metals. For this 
analysis, data are used from January 2007 to December 2015. For a given month, the metal theft 
records indicate the count of a stolen metal across all incidents in that month. Thus, for example, 
if a set of metals were stolen in a given incident, each of the different metals would be recorded 
separately as a stolen item by the CRIS of the MPS. The measure of metal theft that is used for 
this analysis is therefore the count of stolen metals in a given month. Data on metal theft are 
used in the first and second parts of the empirical analysis. 
 This part of the empirical analysis not only estimates metal crime-price elasticities, but 
it also tests their robustness to the inclusion of male unemployment and lagged metal theft in 
the metal crime equation. To this end, it combines time series records of metal theft with time 
series records of metal prices and labour market dynamics. The BTP microdata were aggregated 
up at the monthly level in order to obtain the count of stolen metals in England and Wales in 
each month from January 2007 to December 2015. A similar exercise was done using the MPS 
data, whereby crime records for different metals were summed up to obtain the monthly count 
of metal theft in the region covered by the MPS.  
 Direct data on scrap metal prices were collected from www.letsrecycle.com, a trade 
industry media outlet for the waste management and recycling sector. On www.letsrecycle.com, 
monthly scrap metal prices are available for the period 2007 to current for many types of ferrous 
and nonferrous metals. These data were collected for this study as they are the prices metal 
thieves are likely to view as the true resale value from metal theft. Data on world prices from 
international commodity markets were also collected for this study. This is due to the potential 
endogeneity of local scrap metal prices in the determination of metal theft, e.g., due to the 
potential presence of unobservable non-random factors that may influence metal prices in 
England and Wales as well as may have an independent effect on metal theft, which would 
result in a well-known problem of omitted variable bias. Thus, international metal prices were 
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collected from the online platform “Index Mundi”, where data on international metal prices are 
measured in pounds sterling and are available at the monthly frequency. Finally, data on labour 
market conditions were extracted from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) data 
from 2007 to 2015. The QLFS covers the whole of the UK and it was used for this analysis as 
it collects nationally representative information on demographics and labour market conditions 
of the working-age population in England and Wales.  
Descriptive Analysis 
 Figure 1 shows the count of metal theft incidents in England and Wales from January 
2007 to December 2015 that were recorded by the BTP. Starting from January 2007, a positive 
trend clearly appears in the incidence of metal theft up until 2011. Except in the year 2008, in 
England and Wales the incidence of metal theft grew rapidly in the observation period and it 
hit a record high in 2011. In the same years, largely driven by the demand for raw materials 
from China and other fast-growing economies, the 2000s commodities boom pushed upwards 
the prices of many physical commodities up until 2014. Commodities affected by these trends 
include oil, chemicals, fuels and metals.  
 Figure 2 shows the log values of metal theft in England and Wales and the log values of 
scrap metal prices in England and Wales. Two features are noticeable in Figure 2. First, Figure 
2 shows that metal prices also grew starting from 2007, and they too hit a record high in 2011. 
Up until 2012, Figure 2 shows metal prices and metal theft to follow very similar trends over 
time, arguably reflecting the responsiveness of metal crime to metal prices. One interpretation 
of Figure 2 is that, from 2007 to 2011, metal thieves may have started to steal more driven by 
the growing incentive to steal and sell metal. By 2011, the scale of metal theft in the country 
reached unprecedented levels, and a sense spread across politicians, police forces and the media 
that metal theft had become a major problem. It costed the lives of thieves trespassing on the 
railways, it carried large financial costs for the Network Rail (NR), it disrupted transport 
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services, it caused large costs for cultural heritage, and it also generated large financial costs 
for insurers. For these reasons, anti-metal crime policing and policy interventions started to be 
viewed as necessary to tackle “Britain’s most annoying crime wave” (BBC, 28 September 
20116).  
 The second noticeable feature of Figure 2 is the negative trend in metal theft from 2012 
to 2015. Although metal prices did not continue on the positive trend experienced from 2007 
to 2011, they remained quite stable after 2011. In contrast, starting from 2012, metal theft fell 
sharply. Figure 3 shows the residual (log) metal theft after (log) metal prices have been taken 
into account. In Figure 3 a clear difference appears in the residual incidence of metal theft 
between the periods before and after January 2012. This is after prices have been taken into 
account in the determination of metal theft, thus it suggests that the fall in metal theft from 2012 
to 2015 cannot be explained entirely by the interruption of the pre-2012 positive trend in metal 
prices. Rather, the policing and policy responses implemented in 2012 and 2013 respectively, 
which are assessed in Sections 3 and 4 of the paper, may have played a role. 
 Figure 4 provides an additional piece of evidence that is consistent with this claim. In 
Figure 4, the predicted evolution of metal crime based on pre-2012 metal prices is added to 
Figure 2. To this end, data on metal crime and metal prices was used from January 2007 to 
October 2011, i.e., prior to the Chancellor George Osborne’s announcement of the UK 
government’s intention to use £5 million of Treasury funding to set up a nationwide metal theft 
taskforce.7 Figure 4 clearly suggests that, based on the pre-2012 metal prices, metal crime 
should have remained relatively stable until the end of 2013, with only a marginal decline 
between 2014 and 2015. The actual evolution of metal crime in England and Wales looks 
clearly different from this prediction, as it shows a much steeper fall starting from 2012. This 
was possibly the result of the anti-metal crime policing and policy interventions implemented 
                                                            
6 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15062064 
7 See http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06150/SN06150.pdf 
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in England and Wales starting from 2012. Sections 3 and 4 below subject these descriptive 
findings to a more rigorous statistical testing that defines a proper set of treatment and control 
groups and that takes into account the potential confounding effect of common nationwide time 
trends. 
Research Design 
 To investigate metal crime-price elasticities, and their robustness when other controls 
are added to the analysis, a time series analysis is conducted. In formal terms, the following 
log-log equation is estimated: 
ܮ݋݃ሺܯ ௧ܶሻ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߚଵܮ݋݃ሺܵ ௧ܲሻ ൅ ߛଵܺ௧ ൅ ݂ሺݐሻ ൅ ݒଵ௧ (1) 
where ܯ ௧ܶ is the count of metal theft incidents in month ݐ and ܵ ௧ܲ are local scrap metal prices 
in England and Wales in month ݐ. ܺ௧ is a vector of controls that includes male unemployment 
in month ݐ and ܯ ௧ܶିଵ, i.e., the value of metal theft in month ݐ െ 1, while f(t) represents a time 
control, i.e., either a linear time trend or a set of year fixed effects. Controlling for male 
unemployment aims to estimate the effect of labour market conditions on metal theft. The one-
month-lag value of metal theft was also included in the equation to test the robustness of the 
estimated metal crime-price elasticities to the inclusion of past levels of metal theft in the 
equation. This is relevant due to the potential serial correlation in metal theft and its potential 
correlation with metal prices. 
 Equation (1) forms a baseline specification and is estimated using OLS and Newey-
West standard errors. The key parameter of interest is β1, the metal crime-price elasticity.  There 
are at least two reasons why one might worry about the estimate of β1 being biased. First, it may 
not reflect a causal impact of metal prices on metal theft if simultaneity bias arises from some 
unobserved factors specific to England and Wales that may have an effect on both the dependent 
variable and the key explanatory variable of interest. To circumvent this, international metal 
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prices are used to instrument local scrap metal prices. In formal terms, the instrumental variable 
(IV) approach can be described in terms of the two reduced forms: 
ܮ݋݃ሺܵ ௧ܲሻ ൌ ߙଶ ൅ ߚଶܮ݋݃ሺܫ ௧ܲሻ ൅ ߛଶܺ௧ ൅ ݂ሺݐሻ ൅ ݒଶ௧ (2) 
ܮ݋݃ሺܯ ௧ܶሻ ൌ ߙଷ ൅ ߚଷܮ݋݃ሺܫ ௧ܲሻ ൅ ߛଷܺ௧ ൅ ݂ሺݐሻ ൅ ݒଷ௧ (3) 
where ܫ ௧ܲ is the international price of metals in month ݐ. 
In the first stage (2), estimates of β2 show the impact of international metal prices on 
local scrap metal prices in England and Wales. Equation (3) is the reduced form regression of 
log metal theft on the instrument. The IV local average treatment effect (LATE) estimate is 
then the ratio of the reduced form to the first stage coefficient, β3/β2. 
The second modelling issue arises because of the highly seasonal nature of crime. Thus, 
seasonally differenced versions of equations (1) to (3) are also presented where all variables are 
transformed by the 12-month operator, Δ12, to remove month-specific unobservable effects 
from the data.  For example, equation (1) now becomes: 
∆ଵଶܮ݋݃ሺܯ ௧ܶሻ ൌ ߙସ ൅ ߚସ∆ଵଶܮ݋݃ሺܵ ௧ܲሻ ൅ ߛସ∆ଵଶܺ௧ ൅ ݂ሺݐሻ ൅ ∆ଵଶݒସ௧ (4) 
Using monthly data from January 2008 to December 2015, the analysis is conducted on a total 
of 96 months8, and results are presented for the whole of England and Wales using the BTP 
data, and for London only using both the BTP data and the MPS data described above. 
Results 
 Tables 1 and 2 show the results from the time series analysis of metal crime-price 
elasticities. Results are presented from the BTP data for the whole of England and Wales, from 
the BTP data for London only, and from the MPS data. Looking at Table 1, Panel A (i.e., 
columns (1) to (4)) shows metal crime-price elasticities without seasonal differencing and Panel 
B (i.e., columns (5) to (8)) shows metal crime-price elasticities with seasonal differencing. 
                                                            
8 Data from 2007 were only used to retrieve the 12-month differenced value of metal crime in 2008. 
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Either a linear time trend control or year fixed effects were included in all estimates, and 
Newey-West standard errors were used for inference and are reported in parentheses.  
 The key finding from this exercise is that metal crime-price elasticities always appear 
to be statistically significant and sizeable, with magnitudes greater than unity. Seasonal 
differencing, shown in Panel B, decreases a bit the size of the estimated elasticities, but the 
elasticities remain above unity and statistically significant at all conventional levels. The 
comparisons of our OLS elasticities in columns (1) and (5) with our IV elasticities in columns 
(4) and (8) show the OLS estimates to be downward biased. This may be due to potential 
measurement error in local scrap metal prices in England and Wales, or due to the presence of 
relevant omitted factors that may be correlated with local scrap metal prices. The results in 
Table 1 also show metal crime-price elasticities to be greater in London than in the rest of 
England and Wales. The seasonally-adjusted metal crime-price elasticities in London appear 
very similar whether they are calculated using the BTP data or the MPS data. Greater metal 
crime-price elasticities appear in London both when comparing the estimates from the BTP data 
for England and Wales with estimates from the BTP data for London only, and when comparing 
the estimates for England and Wales with those derived from the MPS data. 
 Table 2 shows the robustness of our estimated IV metal crime-price elasticities to a 
richer Becker specification. The analysis is done again separately on the three datasets presented 
in Table 1 (i.e., BTP data for England and Wales, BTP data for London and MPS data), and 
controls are added for male unemployment and lagged metal theft to the IV metal crime 
equation. These results are shown in the upper panel of Table 2. Although the estimated 
coefficients for metal prices appear smaller in all specifications compared to Table 1, they are 
still large and statistically significant at one percent. Male unemployment appears to be a 
positive predictor of metal theft, suggesting that deteriorating labour market conditions and 
increased joblessness may induce an increase in metal theft. A word of caution is in order 
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though, since the crime-unemployment elasticities do not appear statistically significant when 
seasonal differencing is applied to the analysis. The estimates for lagged metal theft suggest 
there is strong serial correlation in the incidence of metal theft, as the estimated coefficients 
appear positive and significant in all the specifications. For a direct comparison between the 
metal crime-price elasticities reported in Table 1 and those in Table 2, when lagged values of 
metal theft are included in the set of covariates long run crime-price elasticities are calculated 
as ߚ/ሺ1 െ ߣሻ, where ߚ is the estimated coefficient for Log(Scrap Price) and ߣ is the estimated 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. These long run elasticities are also reported below 
the estimated coefficients in each column of Table 2, and are of very similar magnitude to those 
from the static models reported in Table 1. 
 The lower panel of Table 2 shows what happens to these results when the linear time 
trend is replaced with year fixed effects in the estimated equation. While male unemployment 
no longer appears to predict significantly metal theft, the lagged value of metal theft still appears 
as a positive and significant predictor of metal theft. The estimated crime-price elasticities also 
appear robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects in the equation. In some cases, the estimated 
crime-price elasticities appear even larger than in the upper panel. However, the general 
conclusion that emerges throughout our estimates in this section is that metal crime is highly 
responsive to fluctuations in metal prices. This is the case regardless of whether labour market 
conditions or even past metal theft are taken into account, and it suggests that metal thieves are 
highly responsive to changes in the direct incentive to engage in this type of property theft. 
 
3. Metal Crime and Policing 
The second part of the empirical analysis aims to estimate the impact of policing on metal theft. 
To this end, it exploits the exogenous variation in the intensity of policing across police force 
areas (PFAs) in England and Wales that was induced by “Operation Tornado”. Operation 
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Tornado is a novel, problem-oriented policing initiative that was conducted by the BTP in 
England and Wales at the beginning of 2012, i.e., when metal crime was hitting a record high 
in the country. Starting from Levitt (1997), a number of studies have exploited sources of 
plausibly exogenous variation in police workforce to document a crime-reducing effect of 
police staffing (Levitt, 2002; Evans and Owens, 2007; and Lin, 2009)9. Multiple studies have 
also exploited natural experiments to assess the crime-reducing effect of police deployment and 
tactics (Cohen and Ludwig, 2003; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004; Klick and Tabarrok, 2005; 
Draca et al., 2011; and MacDonald, Klick and Grunwald, 2016). These studies show consistent 
evidence from different cities of the crime-reducing effect of police deployment.10 However, 
very few studies exist on problem-oriented policing initiatives, and concerns regarding 
identification suggest caution in the interpretation of the existing evidence (Skogan and Frydl, 
2004; and Chalfin and McCrary, 2017).  
 Operation Tornado (OT) was piloted in January 2012 in the North East regions of 
England (i.e., in the police force areas of Durham, Cleveland and Northumbria) and then 
progressively extended to other regions. Thus, a difference-in-differences specification can be 
defined whereby late adopters of OT are used as controls for the early adopters of OT. For this 
analysis, microdata from the BTP were aggregated up at the PFA-level with monthly frequency. 
These data were combined with data on metal prices in the UK from www.letsrecycle.com and 
with data on international metal prices from the online platform “Index Mundi”. 
Operation Tornado 
The Scrap Metal Dealers Act 1964 was acknowledged as an out of date and ineffective 
piece of legislation that was failing to stem the increases in metal theft. The previous section 
has discussed the significant increase in metal theft from 2007 to 2011 that is shown in Figures 
                                                            
9 Chalfin and McCrary (2017) provide a comprehensive review of this literature. 
10 A different conclusion appears in Mastrobuoni (2013), who finds that criminals are not responsive to large 
regular shift changes among the different police forces in Milan. 
15 
 
1 and 2. As a result, in April 2011 the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the BTP 
and the Home Office (HO) entered into negotiations with the British Metals Recycling 
Association (BMRA) and Directors from the three largest recyclers within the UK to try and 
negotiate a cashless trial. Following Chancellor Osborne’s announcement in November 2011, 
the first intervention was Operation Tornado, which was designed to support the police in 
tackling metal theft and to make it easier to trace sellers and dealers of stolen metals. It required 
participating scrap metal dealers in England and Wales to request identification documentation 
(UK driving licence, passport or utility bill) for every cash sale and retain copies for twelve 
months for inspection by the police. Dealers were requested to ensure CCTV systems covered 
entrances and weighbridges of recycling centres and the images to be of sufficient quality to 
enable identification of vehicle registration numbers and secure facial recognition. Posters 
describing the identification measures in force were prominently displayed to sellers. The 
intervention, which was backed with police enforcement, was piloted in the police forces in the 
North East in January 2012 before being rolled out on a phased basis across England and Wales 
by September 2012. From the perspective of scrap metal dealers, Operation Tornado can be 
thought of as a sudden negative cost shock. 
 A Red, Amber, Green (RAG) standardisation of dealer categorisation was adopted 
within police force areas as part of the Operation Tornado implementation process. This enabled 
enforcement activity to be directed, focused and efficient in terms of tackling criminality within 
a standardised framework. According to BTP, over 80 percent of scrap metal dealers signed up 
to OT and all police forces introduced the national RAG status as part of the roll out of the 
project. These voluntary measures were acknowledged as an effective means of reducing metal 
theft and formed the backbone that supported the introduction of cashless trading in December 
2012.  
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 Although the measures were widely accepted, the absence of a legislative requirement 
to enforce the measures allowed participants to drop in and out with no penalties. In addition, 
one of the larger partners withdrew from the program, and this may have resulted in many others 
following, and thus in a reduction in the overall effectiveness of the measures. These risks 
brought a degree of uncertainty in terms of sustainability, which was one of the factors that 
supported the inclusion of identification in a new Scrap Metal Bill in December 2012. Even 
though, as shown in Figure 4, metal crime after 2012 dropped by much more than it would have 
been predicted at the end of 2011, the absence of a legislative requirement to enforce the 
measures of OT implies that its effectiveness is not obvious a priori. 
Research Design 
The next step is to move on from the time series analysis undertaken in the previous 
section to study the causal effect of policing on metal theft. The first part of the empirical 
analysis has documented the large metal crime-price elasticities and their robustness to a richer 
Becker specification. This part of our analysis investigates the impact of policing on metal theft 
by exploiting the implementation of Operation Tornado (OT) in England and Wales in 2012. It 
investigates whether the discrepancy between the expected and realised evolution of metal 
crime in England and Wales was indeed the result of OT, or it was the result of other underlying 
confounding nationwide factors. For this purpose, a difference-in-differences research design 
is adopted that exploits the gradual introduction over time of OT between different police force 
areas.  
Table 3 provides a timeline of OT adoption between the beginning of 2012, when no 
police force area had adopted OT yet, and September 2012, when the national rollout of OT 
was complete. As Table 3 shows, OT was piloted in the North East police force areas of 
Cleveland, Durham and Northumbria. These regions were chosen for the pilot of the 
programme in order to minimise the risk that OT may result in the displacement, rather than the 
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reduction, of metal theft in the region. In April 2012 the programme was extended to the 
Yorkshire, the Humber and East Midlands police force areas. OT was introduced in the North 
Western regions of England in May 2012 and in the Eastern and Southern regions of the country 
in June 2012. Police forces in London, Wales and the West Midlands did not adopt OT until 
the end of the summer 2012, when they decided to introduce it in their respective jurisdictions.  
The approach taken here is to compare metal crime in police force areas that adopted 
OT before the summer with metal crime in police force areas that adopted OT only at the end 
of the summer. The time window between January and September 2012 is used to evaluate the 
causal impact of OT on metal crime. Scotland is excluded from the analysis since OT was not 
implemented there, and comparable provisions were not adopted until September 2016.11 
Restricting the analysis to PFAs where OT was adopted within a relatively short period of time 
ensures that treated and comparison regions share unobservable common reasons to adopt OT 
(like ethos or urgency to tackle metal theft). As Table 3 shows, 33 police forces introduced OT 
before the summer, while 10 police forces introduced it after the summer. The set of police 
force areas that adopted OT before the summer is labelled ‘early adopters’, and the set of police 
force areas that adopted OT after the summer is labelled ‘late adopters’. Since the control 
regions in our analysis receive the treatment in September 2012, BTP data on metal theft by 
police force area is used from January 2007 to August 2012. Metal crime in the set of ‘early 
adopters’ is then compared with metal crime in the set of ‘late adopters’ in the time window 
from January to August 2012. The unit of observation in our analysis is the police force area, 
p, over time and metal crime is measured with monthly frequency. In formal terms, the basic 
difference-in-differences set up is: 
ܯ ௣ܶ௧ ൌ ߠ௣ ൅ ߚହܵ ௧ܲ ൅ ߨହܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߮ହܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ∗ ܱ ௣ܶ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ݒହ௧ (5) 
                                                            
11 See https://www.recyclemetals.org/newsandarticles/cash-ban-arrives-in-scotland.html. 
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 Equation (5) is specified in the levels of ܯ ௣ܶ௧ and ܵ ௧ܲ because there is a relatively high 
frequency of zeros in ܯܶ at the police force area level with monthly frequency. ܯ ௣ܶ௧ is the 
monthly count of metal theft incidents in police force area ݌ in month ݐ per 10,000 population, 
ܵ ௧ܲ is local scrap metal prices in month ݐ, and ܱ ௣ܶ is a binary variable that takes up value 1 if 
police force area ݌ is an ‘early adopter’ of OT and value 0 otherwise. ܲ݋ݏݐ௧ is a binary variable 
that takes up value 1 starting from January 2012, i.e., from the beginning of OT, and value 0 in 
the previous month-years. θp denotes a set of police force area fixed effects (which also absorbs 
the time invariant ܱ ௣ܶ levels variable, which is not shown in (5)) and θt is a set of time fixed 
effects.  
Insofar as, prior to the policing intervention, metal theft displayed similar trends in 
treatment and control regions, the interaction between these variables, i.e. ܲ݋ݏݐ௧ ∗ ܱ ௣ܶ, 
identifies the causal effect of OT on metal theft and, thus, ߮ହ is the key coefficient of interest. 
Similarly to what was done in the previous section, all throughout this part of the analysis, local 
scrap metal prices in England and Wales in month ݐ are instrumented using international metal 
prices in month ݐ, i.e., ܫ ௧ܲ in equations (2) and (3). Given the possibility that there may be 
unobservable police force area-specific trends in crime that may affect our results, a more 
stringent specification additionally includes police force area-specific linear time trends, θp*t. 
In all our analysis, Newey-West standard errors are estimated for inference. Finally, equation 
(5) is estimated with and without seasonal differencing to control for seasonality in metal crime. 
Descriptive Difference-in-Differences 
 Table 4 shows the results from an unconditional difference-in-differences exercise 
comparing metal crime in early adopters of OT with metal crime in late adopters of OT. 
Considering first early adopters of OT in panel A of Table 4, column (1) reveals that, on 
average, 0.032 incidents of metal crime per 10,000 population occurred per month in the years 
prior to January 2012, and that this dropped to 0.020 in the time window from January to August 
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2012. There is much less change in the late adopters’ regions where, if anything, metal crime 
decreased only slightly in 2012 compared to previous years. By taking the difference between 
these ‘pre’ and ‘post’ metal crime rates, and then differencing across these yields the difference-
in-differences (DiD) estimate shown in column (3). This is sizeable at -0.011 for the early 
adopters, showing that they did experience a reduction in metal crime during the 
implementation period of OT. Since the average count of metal theft per 10,000 population per 
month prior to 2012 was 0.031, this statistically significant drop represents a 35 percent 
decrease in metal theft following the introduction of OT. Panel B shows the results of the 
seasonally adjusted (i.e., 12-month differenced) unconditional difference-in-differences 
comparison. As column (6) shows, adjusting for seasonality does not affect our conclusion, as 
a 0.012 statistically significant reduction in metal crime appears again for police force areas 
that adopted OT before the summer 2012. 
 The validity of these conclusions is supported by Figure 5, which shows our treated and 
control regions to be on very similar metal crime trends in the years prior to the implementation 
of OT. In particular, Figure 5 shows metal crime trends after seasonal adjustment was applied 
to the metal crime figures. The Figure shows that until the end of 2011 both the levels and the 
trends of metal crime appear very similar between early adopters and late adopters of OT. 
Starting from January 2012, however, a discrepancy appears between the two groups, with 
treatment regions experiencing a drop in metal crime compared to control regions. The 
discrepancy in metal crime between the two groups appears particularly evident in the March 
to June period, when all the early adopters gradually adopted OT. 
Results 
 This section turns to the main statistical estimates that look at the causal effect of OT on 
metal crime. Table 5 shows the main set of estimates of the causal effect of OT on metal crime. 
Overall, the results confirm the conclusions from the unconditional DiD estimates of the 
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previous section, as they show a reduction in metal theft in the order of 35 percent. To be 
precise, columns (a) to (c) show our results without seasonal differencing, whereas columns (d) 
and (e) show our estimates with seasonal adjustment. In a similar manner to the analysis of 
metal crime and prices, local scrap metal prices in England and Wales in month ݐ were 
instrumented with international metal prices in month ݐ. 
 Column (a) of Table 5 shows results without controlling for month-year fixed effects, 
as this allows us to identify both the causal impact of OT and the causal impact of metal prices 
on metal crime. Column (a) displays the positive and significant impact of metal prices on metal 
theft. This result is consistent with our results from the previous section, as it shows the 
importance of price incentives for metal thieves to engage in metal crime also once the causal 
impact of policing on metal crime is taken into account. Column (b) shows that inclusion of 
month-year fixed effects has no effect on our estimate of the effect of OT on metal crime. 
Controlling for PFA-specific time trends, as shown in column (c), results in a slightly smaller 
estimate of the impact of OT, but the effect of OT on metal theft is still estimated to be negative 
and significant at the five percent level. Column (d) shows that seasonal differencing increases 
the size and significance of the estimated effect of OT on metal theft.  
This conclusion that there was a reduction in metal theft as a result of the introduction 
of OT is further corroborated by the results in column (e) of Table 5, which displays seasonally-
adjusted event study difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of OT on metal crime. 
Figure 6 provides a graphical representation of these results. The event study generates separate 
estimates of OT impact months since January 2012, but also allows examination of possible 
pre-2012 differences in trends between treatment and control police force areas. To be precise, 
each coefficient represents the interaction between treatment status (i.e., ܱ ௣ܶ in equation (5)) 
and a dummy for two months of observation in our study period. Thus, ‘OT x Pre 1’ tests 
whether there were any differential crime trends between treatment and control regions in 
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November and December 2011 (i.e., two months prior to the start date of OT). ‘OT x Pre 2’ 
tests whether there were any differential crime trends between treatment and control regions in 
September and October 2011. ‘OT x Pre 3’ tests the presence of differential pre-trends between 
treatment and controls in July and August 2011, and ‘OT x Pre 4’ tests this in May and June 
2011. By the same token, OT x Post 1 shows the impact of OT in January and February 2012, 
OT x Post 2 shows the impact of OT in March and April 2012, OT x Post 3 shows the impact 
of OT in May and June 2012, and OT x Post 4 shows the impact of OT in July and August 
2012, just before the control police force areas also introduced OT.  
There are two notable features. First, are parallel pre-2012 trends between treatment and 
control PFAs. This is also confirmed by the joint insignificance of the estimated differential 
pre-trends that is displayed in Figure 6. This suggests that treated regions were not experiencing 
differential trends in metal crime prior to the introduction of OT, and thus any negative 
discrepancy between treatment and controls after the start of OT can be safely interpreted as 
the impact of the adoption of OT on metal crime. Second, there is a steep drop in the count of 
metal theft incidents per 10,000 population starting from March/April 2012 in the treated police 
force areas. Although Figure 6 shows all the estimated treatment effects after January 2012 to 
be jointly significant at one percent, the impact of OT on metal theft appears to be concentrated 
in the months from March to June 2012, when all treated police forces had started OT in their 
respective regions. This makes intuitive sense, and it reflects the importance of policing in 
deterring crime also in the presence of strong economic incentives to engage in such illicit 
activities.  
 
4. Metal Crime and Policy  
The third part of the empirical analysis assesses the impact of the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013 
(SMDA) on the economic activity of Scrap Metal Dealers (SMDs) in England and Wales. The 
22 
 
SMDA 2013 came into force in October 2013 and it superseded the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 
1964. Amongst other things, the SMDA 2013 introduced new provisions for the issuance and 
revocation of a scrap metal licence, for the verification of scrap metal suppliers’ identities and 
it introduced the offence of buying scrap metal for cash.12 This part of the paper investigates to 
which extent these provisions affected the economic activity of scrap metal dealers in England 
and Wales that were the target of this reform. The idea here is that the new legislation may have 
decreased the fungibility of stolen metal and, thus, it may have reduced the market size for 
metal thieves to sell what they have stolen.13  
 Related studies on the effect of changes in the legislation on property theft include 
Morgan et al. (2016) and Van Ours and Vollaard (2016). Morgan et al. (2016) shows the 
negative link between vehicle theft and the pace at which electronic immobilisers were 
mandated on new vehicles in Europe, Australia, the US and Canada. Van Ours and Vollaard 
(2016) documents the crime-reducing impact of the compulsory application in new passenger 
cars in the European Union of the electronic engine immobiliser.14 The channel through which 
the diffusion of electronic immobilisers reduced crime was by making vehicle theft more 
difficult. The introduction of the SMDA 2013 also brought about a crime bust. However, it 
constitutes a different kind of natural experiment because the SMDA 2013 did not make metal 
theft more difficult; rather, it made stolen metal harder to sell and, thus, it made metal theft 
unlikely to be as profitable as it was before. 
The Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013 
 The Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013 (SMDA) was enacted on the 28 February 2013 and 
its implementation was carried out by October 2013. The SMDA followed Operation Tornado 
                                                            
12  A complete description of the provisions of the SMDA 2013 is publicly available here: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/10/enacted. 
13 A number of recent studies in economics has used data on licit markets to provide insights into illegal activities 
(e.g., Fisman and Wei, 2004; Olken, 2007; Sukhtankar, 2012; and Parey and Rasul, 2016). 
14 Ayres and Levitt (1998) and Gonzalez-Navarro (2013) previously studied the vehicle theft deterrence effect of 
the Lojack, a small device hidden inside a vehicle that allows it to be tracked after a theft occurs. 
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and it superseded the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 1964, as it aimed to provide a more effective 
regulatory framework to the scrap metal and recycling industry in England and Wales. By 
generating a tougher licensing regime that was run by local authorities, the SMDA 2013 aimed 
to support legitimate SMDs while hindering the activities of unscrupulous dealers. As a result 
of the SMDA 2013, local authorities were given the power to grant or refuse a licence upon 
application, depending on whether they were persuaded or not that the applicant was a suitable 
person to run an SMD. The SMDA 2013 also enabled local authorities to revoke a licence at 
any time, as well as to shut down SMDs that operate without a licence.  
 Local authorities can grant two types of licences to SMDs, namely a site licence or a 
mobile collector licence. The site licence requires identification of all the sites within the local 
authority where the SMD intends to operate and the identification of a manager for each of 
them, as it allows the SMD to operate only at the sites listed on the licence. The mobile collector 
licence allows the SMD to collect both domestic and commercial scrap metal in the area of the 
issuing local authority. This licence does not permit to operate at a fixed site, nor to collect 
scrap metal from any other local authority area. For this, an additional licence from another 
local authority ought to be obtained by the mobile collector. SMD licences normally last for a 
period of three years starting from the date of issuance of the licence. In line with Operation 
Tornado, the SMDA 2013 also posed a legal obligation on SMDs to keep records of all 
transactions and to request a proof of identity from their counterpart in every transaction. 
Research Design  
 A natural question to ask is whether the provisions of the SMDA 2013 affected the 
economic activity of pre-existing SMDs in England and Wales? This section of the paper 
exploits the differential intensity in exposure to the SMDA 2013 across different firms to define 
a difference-in-differences specification to investigate this question. Since the SMDA 2013 
introduced strict regulations to the activity of SMDs, while it did not alter the laws governing 
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the activity of other similar businesses, the latter can be used as a control group for the former. 
In order to compare the economic activity of SMDs with the economic activity of firms that 
share similar observable and unobservable features, the control group includes only pawnshops 
and firms involved in the collection, recovery and wholesale of other waste (i.e., not scrap 
metal).  
 For this analysis, firm-level data from the Fame website were used from the fiscal year 
2010 to 2015 with yearly frequency. The analysis includes firms which are still active at the 
time of writing, and for which complete information was available from the Fame website for 
the fiscal years 2010 to 2015. The unit of observation in this analysis is the firm, f, over time 
and economic activity is measured with yearly frequency. In formal terms, the basic difference-
in-differences set up can be expressed as follows: 
             ௙ܻ௧ ൌ ߠ௙ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܯܦ௙ ൅ ݇଺ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߬଺ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ∗ ܵܯܦ௙ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ݒ଺௧, (6) 
where ௙ܻ௧ is the yearly measure of economic activity of firms in England and Wales. Three 
measures of economic activity are used in this analysis. The first is the firm f’s turnover in year 
t; this information is collected on the Fame database every year at the end of the fiscal year and 
it includes national and international turnover. The second outcome of interest is the firm f’s 
turnover normalised by number of employees in year t, which is firm f’s turnover in year t 
divided by firm f’s number of employees in year t. The third outcome of interest in this analysis 
is the firm f’s EBITDA margin at time t (i.e., Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 
Amortization), which is defined as firm f’s operating profit in year t divided by firm f’s turnover 
in year t. ܵܯܦ௙ is a binary variable that takes up value 1 if the firm is a scrap metal dealer and 
value 0 for control firms, ܲ݋ݏݐ௧ is a binary variable that takes up value 1 starting from the fiscal 
year 2014, i.e., after the SMDA 2013 came into force in October 2013, and value 0 in previous 
years. θf denotes a set of firm fixed effects (which also absorbs the time invariant ܵܯܦ௙ levels 
variable) and θt is a set of time fixed effects. 
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Insofar as, prior to the SMDA 2013, our outcomes of interest were on similar trends in 
treatment and control firms, the estimate of ߬଺ in equation (6) identifies the causal impact of 
the SMDA 2013 on the economic activity of scrap metal dealers in England and Wales. 
Similarly to what was done in the previous section, this proposition was tested formally for 
every outcome variable with the inclusion in equation (6) of a set of interactions between pre-
treatment time dummies and the treatment status, i.e., ܵܯܦ௙. As before, Newey-West standard 
errors were computed and used for inference in all specifications.  
Descriptive Difference-in-Differences 
 Table 6 shows the results from an unconditional difference-in-differences exercise 
comparing our measures of economic activity of interest in SMDs with our measures of interest 
in control firms. Considering first turnover of firms in panel A of Table 6, column (1) reveals 
that, on average, the turnover of SMDs decreased after the introduction of the SMDA 2013. 
Column (2) shows that much less variation occurred in control firms, where, if anything, the 
turnover increased slightly after 2013. The difference-in-differences comparison between 
treatment and control firms shows a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that the 
turnover of SMDs was significantly hindered by the provisions of the SMDA 2013.  
 Analysis of firms’ turnover per employee, in panel B of Table 6, shows a very similar 
pattern in column (1) for SMDs over time. Control firms experienced a negative growth in this 
outcome variable, but the change is much smaller than in treated firms. The resulting difference-
in-differences coefficient is again negative and significant, further suggesting that the SMDA 
2013 had a negative effect on the economic activity of SMDs. The consistency in the results in 
panels A and B arguably suggests that little modifications in the number of employees took 
place in SMDs following the SMDA 2013 relative to the fall in turnover.  
 Panel C of Table 6 shows unconditional difference-in-differences results for EBITDA 
margin. While both treatment and control firms experienced a decline in EBITDA margin over 
26 
 
time, the decline was seen to be significantly more pronounced in the treatment group. The 
resulting difference-in-differences estimate is negative and statistically significant at five 
percent, further suggesting that the SMDA 2013 may have hampered the economic activity of 
SMDs in England and Wales. The visual inspection of Figure 7, which shows the evolution of 
average EBITDA margin for scrap metal dealers and control firms from 2010 to 2015, confirms 
this. While similar patterns are observed in the average EBITDA margin of treatment and 
control firms until 2013, after the SMDA 2013 scrap metal dealers recorded a lower average 
EBITDA margin and a larger discrepancy appeared compared to control firms. The next section 
subjects these descriptive findings to more stringent specifications that take into account year- 
and firm-specific unobserved fixed effects, as well as evaluate the potential presence of 
differential pre-treatment trends between treatment and control firms.  
Results 
 Table 7 shows the results of this analysis. Columns (a) to (c) show results for turnover, 
columns (d) to (f) show results for turnover per employee and columns (g) to (i) show results 
for EBITDA margin. All specifications include firm fixed effects, and Newey-West standard 
errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Columns (a) and (b) show that, on 
average, the SMDA 2013 had a negative and statistically significant impact on the turnover of 
SMDs in England and Wales. Inclusion of year fixed effects does little to our estimates, as the 
estimated negative effect is stable at 17.3 percent in columns (a) and (b)15. Column (c) shows 
the result of this exercise when only firms for which complete data on all outcome variables of 
interest are included in the analysis. In column (c), the estimated coefficient appears slightly 
larger, but it appears very similar to the estimates in columns (a) and (b). The inspection of 
columns (d) to (f), where turnover per employee is the outcome of interest, leads to similar 
conclusions. The SMDA 2013 decreased turnover per employee of SMDs by 14.7 percent, with 
                                                            
15 Since the natural logarithm of turnover is modelled on the right hand side of equation (6), the size of the percent 
effect was calculated as follows: 100 ∗ ሺ݁ఛల െ 1ሻ, where ߬଺ is the difference-in-differences coefficient in (6). 
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a slightly larger effect displayed in column (f), where the analysis is restricted to firms for which 
complete data on all outcome variables of interest is available. 
 Columns (g) to (i) show that, due to the introduction of the SMDA 2013, SMDs also 
experienced a slowdown in their EBITDA margin. Since EBITDA margins can take up negative 
values, the unit value (and not the logarithmic value) of EBITDA margin was modelled on the 
right-hand side of the equation16. Columns (g) and (h) show that, on average, EBITDA margins 
of SMDs fell by 2.3 percentage points as a result of the SMDA 2013. Column (i) shows that, 
also in this case, a slightly larger effect appears when the analysis is restricted to firms for which 
complete data on all outcome variables of interest is available. 
Table 8 shows the results from a set of event-study estimates for our outcome variables of 
interest. Columns (a) and (b) show results for turnover, columns (c) and (d) show results for 
turnover by number of employees and columns (e) and (f) show results for EBITDA margin. In 
all cases, Table 8 shows there to be no differential pre-treatment trends, with the estimated 
effects of the SMDA 2013 on our outcomes of interest appearing negative and significant, and 
larger in magnitude in 2015. These results confirm that the SMDA 2013 had a negative effect 
on the economic activity of SMDs, and it also plausibly reflects the moderate time lag with 
which the economic activity of SMDs started to be negatively affected by the provisions of the 
SMDA 2013.    
Overall, the results in Tables 6, 7 and 8 provide evidence that the stricter regulation 
regime introduced by the SMDA 2013 had a negative effect on the economic activity of SMDs. 
This is likely to reflect the reduced scope for selling stolen metal to SMDs for metal thieves 
under the new regulatory regime. In turn, this also suggests that the provisions of the SMDA 
2013 may have reduced metal theft. This is not tested explicitly in this section, but it appears 
as one plausible channel explaining the results presented here. Since the SMDA 2013 was 
                                                            
16 For this exercise, only firms that recorded EBITDA margins from -.3 to +.3 were included in the analysis. 
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introduced after our sample period ends for the evaluation of Operation Tornado (i.e., after 
September 2012), the results in this section document the importance of policy and regulatory 
interventions, over and above policing, for the deterrence of crime in the presence of strong 
economic incentives to engage in illicit activities. This is an important conclusion that extends 
beyond the market of metals, as it is of immediate relevance for the regulation and security of 
other markets, such as the market for cars, smartphones and credit cards. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper studies the roles of prices, policing and policy in shaping the metal crime boom and 
bust that occurred in the UK in the nine years between 2007 and 2015. Each of the three 
dimensions has a significant impact. First, the analysis documents important metal crime-price 
elasticities that are big in magnitude. This very much confirms that economic motives lie behind 
the metal crime boom. Secondly and thirdly though, it seems like the reaction to the boom by 
the authorities (police and government) brought about the bust. A difference-in-differences 
analysis shows that a novel anti-metal crime operation led by the British Transport Police led 
to significant consequences – and so did the government’s introduction of the Scrap Metal 
Dealers Act 2013, which is exploited to study the impact of policy on the economic activity of 
scrap metal dealers in England and Wales.  
 Our estimates document that metal crime is highly responsive to metal price dynamics. 
However, the policing response of the BTP in England and Wales reduced metal crime by an 
estimated 35 percent. The ensuing introduction of the SMDA 2013 caused a fall in the turnover 
of scrap metal dealers operating in England and Wales of around 17 percent between 2014 and 
2015. Turnover per employee of SMDs also fell by an estimated 15 percent, suggesting that the 
drop in turnover is not explained by disproportionate rates of dismissal of employees in SMDs. 
The EBITDA margin of SMDs also reduced by a sizeable amount. This is likely the result of 
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the reduced scope for potential metal criminals to sell what they have stolen to SMDs, and by 
association reflects the diluted economic returns of metal crime under the new, stricter, 
regulatory regime. 
 In conclusion, the evidence reported in the paper shows that prices, policing and policy 
all played a significant role in shaping the boom and bust of metal crime. Its initial rapid rise 
into a crime boom was driven by big rises in commodity prices, and then police intervention 
and government policy quelled the rise, bringing about a crime bust. This is probably one of 
the more extreme cases of crime boom and bust that one can study, but the basic notion that 
crime dynamics embodied in the boom and bust apply is very likely to be a broader one that is 
relevant for other crimes, and one that future research should certainly investigate in other 
contexts. 
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Figure 1. BTP Levels of Metal Theft in England and Wales 
 
  
 
  
Notes: Monthly counts of metal theft were calculated using metal crime records from the British Transport 
Police in England and Wales. Data from the BTP was available from January 2007 to December 2015. The 
‘Jan 2012’ dotted line represents the time of the introduction of Operation Tornado, while the ‘Oct 2013’ 
dotted line represents the time of the introduction of the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013. 
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Figure 2. BTP Logs of Metal Theft and Metal Prices in England and Wales 
 
  
 
 
  
Notes: Monthly counts of metal theft were calculated using metal crime records from the British Transport 
Police in England and Wales. Data from the BTP was available from January 2007 to December 2015. Data 
on local scrap metal prices in England and Wales was collected from www.letsrecycle.com. The ‘Jan 2012’ 
dotted line represents the time of the introduction of Operation Tornado, while the ‘Oct 2013’ dotted line 
represents the time of the introduction of the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013. 
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Figure 3. BTP Logs of Metal Theft Residuals after Metal Prices in England and Wales 
 
  
  
Notes: Figure 3 shows the predicted residual monthly counts of metal theft in England and Wales in the 
regression of monthly counts of metal theft on local scrap metal prices in England and Wales from January 
2007 to December 2015. Monthly counts of metal theft were calculated using metal crime records from the 
British Transport Police in England and Wales. Data from the BTP was available from January 2007 to 
December 2015. Data on local scrap metal prices in England and Wales was collected from 
www.letsrecycle.com. The ‘Jan 2012’ dotted line represents the time of the introduction of Operation 
Tornado, while the ‘Oct 2013’ dotted line represents the time of the introduction of the Scrap Metal Dealers 
Act 2013. 
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Figure 4. BTP Log of Metal Theft, Forecasted Log of Metal Theft and Log Metal Prices in 
England and Wales 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Monthly counts of metal theft were calculated using metal crime records from the British Transport 
Police in England and Wales. Data from the BTP was available from January 2007 to December 2015. Data 
on local scrap metal prices in England and Wales was collected from www.letsrecycle.com. The ‘Jan 2012’ 
dotted line represents the time of the introduction of Operation Tornado, while the ‘Oct 2013’ dotted line 
represents the time of the introduction of the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013. Predicted Metal Crime was 
calculated using data from January 2007 to October 2011, i.e., before any anti-metal crime policing and policy 
intervention was announced. 
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Figure 5. Metal Theft, Difference-In-Differences, 2008 – August 2012.  
(With Seasonal Differencing) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Number of observations: 2408. Post-period defined as starting from January 2012, i.e., the earliest 
date of adoption of Operation Tornado. Treatment regions (T = 1) defined as police forces of Cleveland, 
Durham, Northumbria, Humberside, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Norfolk, 
Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater 
Manchester, Lancashire, Merseyside, Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Suffolk, 
Hampshire, Kent, Surrey, Sussex, Thames Valley, Avon and Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, Dorset, 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire. Untreated Regions (T = 0) defined as Dyfed-Powys, Gwent, North Wales, South 
Wales, Staffordshire, Warwickshire, West Mercia, West Midlands, Metropolitan Police Service and City of 
London. Metal theft defined as 12-month differenced total monthly counts of metal thefts per 10,000 
population at the police force area level. 
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Figure 6. Event-Study OLS Estimates of Impact of Operation Tornado on Metal Theft,  
2008 – Aug 2012. 
 
 
 
݌ ൐ ܨ ൌ 0.223 ݌ ൐ ܨ ൌ 0.008 
Notes: Post-period defined as starting from January 2012, i.e., the earliest date of adoption of Operation 
Tornado. Treatment group (T = 1) defined as police forces of Cleveland, Durham, Northumbria, 
Humberside, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Norfolk, Derbyshire, Leicestershire, 
Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire, 
Merseyside, Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Suffolk, Hampshire, Kent, Surrey, 
Sussex, Thames Valley, Avon and Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire. 
Comparison group (T = 0) defined as Dyfed-Powys, Gwent, North Wales, South Wales, Staffordshire, 
Warwickshire, West Mercia, West Midlands, Metropolitan Police Service and City of London. Metal theft 
defined as total monthly counts of metal thefts per 10,000 population at the police force area level. 
Regressions weighted by population at the police force area level. Reported dots are point estimates and 
capped bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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Figure 7. Average EBITDA Margin for Scrap Metal Dealers and Control Firms in England 
and Wales, 2010 – 2015. 
 
 
Notes: Figure 7 reports average EBITDA Margin for treatment and control firms by year. Treatment group 
(T = 1) defined as scrap metal dealers. Comparison group (T = 0) defined as pawnshops and all other 
businesses involved in the collection of non-hazardous waste, recovery of sorted materials, wholesale of 
metals and metal ores and wholesale of waste. Only firms that were still active at the time of writing, i.e., 
early 2018, and for which complete data was available from 2010 to 2015 were included in the analysis. 
EBITDA Margin was calculated as Operating Profit / Turnover. Operating Profit equals Gross Profit - 
Administration Expenses + Other Operating Income/Costs pre OP + Exceptional Items pre OP. Turnover 
includes both national and international turnover.
40 
 
 
Table 1. Estimates of Metal Crime-Price Elasticities, 2008 to 2015. 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS Reduced 
Form 
First  
Stage 
IV Structural 
Form 
OLS OLS Reduced 
Form 
First  
Stage 
IV Structural 
Form 
 ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܥݎ݅݉݁ሻ 
ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܥݎ݅݉݁ሻ 
ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܵܿݎܽ݌ ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ሻ 
ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܥݎ݅݉݁ሻ 
ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܥݎ݅݉݁ሻ 
ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܥݎ݅݉݁ሻ 
ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܵܿݎܽ݌ ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ሻ 
ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܥݎ݅݉݁ሻ 
A. BTP Data, 
England and Wales 
        
ܮ݋݃ሺܵܿݎܽ݌	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ሻ       1.673***      
(0.168) 
           1.875***    
(0.190) 
           0.900***   
(0.146) 
  1.044***    
(0.164) 
ܮ݋݃ሺܹ݋ݎ݈݀	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ሻ          2.090***    
(0.150) 
          1.115***    
(0.090) 
             1.146***   
(0.131) 
    1.098***    
(0.096) 
 
B. BTP Data, 
London 
        
ܮ݋݃ሺܵܿݎܽ݌	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ሻ       2.181***    
(0.252) 
           2.524***   
(0.295) 
           1.473***   
(0.196) 
  1.645***    
(0.248) 
ܮ݋݃ሺܹ݋ݎ݈݀	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ሻ          2.813***    
(0.290) 
          1.115***    
(0.090) 
             1.805***   
(0.260) 
    1.098***    
(0.096) 
 
C. MPS Data, 
London 
        
ܮ݋݃ሺܵܿݎܽ݌	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ሻ       1.849***    
(0.173) 
           2.018***   
(0.185) 
           1.435***   
(0.166) 
  1.449***    
(0.183) 
ܮ݋݃ሺܹ݋ݎ݈݀	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ሻ         2.250***    
(0.165) 
          1.115***    
(0.090) 
             1.591***   
(0.207) 
    1.098***    
(0.096) 
 
F-Statistic            127.94            74.99  
Linear Time Trend  Yes           Yes             Yes             Yes                Yes               Yes           Yes       Yes 
Δଵଶ Differenced  No            No              No              No                Yes               Yes           Yes       Yes 
Number of Months  96            96              96              96                 96                96             96         96 
Notes: Metal theft defined as (Log) total monthly counts of total thefts. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 2. Estimates of Metal Crime, Price and Labour Market Elasticities, 2008 to 2015. 
 
 BTP Data,  
England and Wales 
BTP Data,  
London 
MPS Data,  
London 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IV Structural 
Form 
IV Structural 
Form 
IV Structural 
Form 
IV Structural 
Form 
IV Structural 
Form 
IV Structural 
Form 
 ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܥݎ݅݉݁ሻ
ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܥݎ݅݉݁ሻ
ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܥݎ݅݉݁ሻ 
ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܥݎ݅݉݁ሻ
ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܥݎ݅݉݁ሻ
ܮ݋݃ 
ሺܥݎ݅݉݁ሻ
       
ܮ݋݃ሺܵܿݎܽ݌	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ሻ 
 
0.907*** 
(0.170) 
0.527*** 
(0.119) 
1.299*** 
(0.371) 
0.977*** 
(0.315) 
0.741*** 
(0.123) 
0.449*** 
(0.112) 
ܮ݋݃ ሺܯ݈ܽ݁	ܷ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݉݁݊ݐሻ
 
0.495*** 
(0.166) 
-0.044 
(0.185) 
0.502 
(0.305) 
0.308 
(0.370) 
0.272*** 
(0.087) 
0.008 
(0.101) 
ܮ݋݃	ሺܮܽ݃݃݁݀	ܯ݁ݐ݈ܽ	݄݂ܶ݁ݐሻ
 
0.477*** 
(0.103) 
0.579*** 
(0.075) 
0.419*** 
(0.111) 
0.447*** 
(0.110) 
0.623*** 
(0.053) 
0.749*** 
(0.057) 
        
Long Run ܮ݋݃ሺܵܿݎܽ݌	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ሻ  1.734*** 
(0.226) 
 1.250*** 
(0.238) 
 2.235*** 
(0.412) 
 1.767*** 
(0.418) 
 1.966*** 
(0.304) 
 1.786*** 
(0.299) 
Linear Time Trend      Yes        Yes        Yes         Yes        Yes        Yes 
Δଵଶ Differenced       No        Yes         No         Yes         No        Yes 
Number of Months       96          96         96          96         96         96 
       
ܮ݋݃ ሺܵܿݎܽ݌	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ሻ 
 
0.905*** 
(0.206) 
0.553*** 
(0.143) 
1.788*** 
(0.504) 
1.511*** 
(0.389) 
0.860*** 
(0.144) 
0.351** 
(0.139) 
ܮ݋݃ ሺܯ݈ܽ݁	ܷ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݉݁݊ݐሻ
 
0.566 
(0.382) 
-0.047 
(0.305) 
0.363 
(0.469) 
0.585 
(0.482) 
0.165 
(0.138) 
-0.131 
(0.136) 
ܮ݋݃ ሺܮܽ݃݃݁݀	ܯ݁ݐ݈ܽ	݄݂ܶ݁ݐሻ
 
0.388*** 
(0.125) 
0.410*** 
(0.101) 
0.235* 
(0.133) 
0.265** 
(0.113) 
0.414*** 
(0.070) 
0.768*** 
(0.101) 
        
Long Run ܮ݋݃ሺܵܿݎܽ݌ ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ሻ  1.479*** 
(0.279) 
 0.937*** 
(0.245) 
 2.336*** 
(0.544) 
 2.054*** 
(0.492) 
 1.469*** 
(0.235) 
 1.516*** 
(0.383) 
Year Fixed Effects      Yes        Yes        Yes         Yes        Yes        Yes 
Δଵଶ Differenced       No        Yes         No         Yes         No        Yes 
Number of Months       96          96         96          96         96         96 
 
 Notes: Metal theft defined as (Log) total monthly counts of total thefts. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level. * indicates significance at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table 3. Timeline of Roll Out of Operation Tornado. 
 
Start Date Region 
(Local Police Forces) 
03 January 2012 North East 
(Cleveland, Durham, Northumbria) 
02 April 2012 Yorkshire and the Humber 
(Humberside, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire), Norfolk. 
03 April 2012 East Midlands 
(Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire). 
09 May 2012 North West 
(Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire, Merseyside). 
11 June 2012 Eastern 
(Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Suffolk). 
25 June 2012 South East and South West 
(Hampshire, Kent, Surrey, Sussex, Thames Valley, Avon and Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, 
Dorset, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire). 
01 September 
2012 
Wales 
(Dyfed-Powys, Gwent, North Wales, South Wales) 
10 September 
2012 
West Midlands 
(Staffordshire, Warwickshire, West Mercia, West Midlands) 
17 September 
2012 
London 
(Metropolitan Police Service, City of London) 
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Table 4. Metal Theft, Difference-In-Differences, 2008 – August 2012. 
       
 
Dependent Variable: Metal Theft Incidents per 10,000 population 
 
  
Early Adopters  
vs  
Late Adopters 
 
  
 Panel A 
Not Seasonally Differenced 
Panel B 
Seasonally Differenced 
   
  
Not Seasonally Differenced 
 
Seasonally Differenced  
 
   
 All Total Difference Total Difference 
  Pre Post (post-pre) Pre Post (post-pre) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
        
Treated 
Police Forces 
33 0.032 0.020 -0.012 0.003 -0.024 -0.027 
        
Late Adopters 10 0.028 0.027 -0.001 0.004 -0.011 -0.015 
        
Difference-in-
differences 
   -0.011*** 
(0.004) 
  -0.012** 
(0.004) 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Number of observations: 2408. Post-period defined as starting from January 2012, i.e., the earliest date 
of adoption of Operation Tornado. Treatment group (T = 1) defined as police forces of Cleveland, Durham, 
Northumbria, Humberside, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Norfolk, Derbyshire, 
Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater Manchester, 
Lancashire, Merseyside, Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Suffolk, Hampshire, Kent, 
Surrey, Sussex, Thames Valley, Avon and Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire. 
Comparison group (T = 0) defined as Dyfed-Powys, Gwent, North Wales, South Wales, Staffordshire, 
Warwickshire, West Mercia, West Midlands, Metropolitan Police Service and City of London. Metal theft 
defined as total monthly counts of metal thefts per 10,000 population at the police force area level. Newey-
West standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** Difference-in-Differences statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. ** Difference-in-Differences statistically significant at the 5 percent level. * Difference-in-
Differences statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5. OLS Estimates of Impact of Operation Tornado on Metal Theft, 2008 – August 2012. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Metal Theft Incidents per 10,000 population 
  
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
      
OT x Post -0.011***    
(0.003) 
-0.011***   
(0.003) 
-0.009**   
(0.003) 
-0.013***   
(0.005) 
  
Metal Price (X 100)  0.003***    
(0.000) 
       
OT x Pre 4         0.009        
(0.008) 
OT x Pre 3        -0.014*       
(0.008) 
OT x Pre 2         -0.001        
(0.008) 
OT x Pre 1         0.005        
(0.007) 
OT x Post 1        -0.010        
(0.009) 
OT x Post 2        -0.021**      
(0.010) 
OT x Post 3        -0.022***    
(0.007) 
OT x Post 4      0.001        
(0.009) 
Mean Dep. Var. Pre  0.031  0.031  0.031  0.031  0.031 
PFA FE     Yes     Yes     Yes      Yes      Yes 
Month-Year FE      No     Yes     Yes      Yes      Yes 
PFA-Specific Trends      No      No     Yes      Yes      Yes 
Seasonal Differencing      No      No      No      Yes      Yes 
      
No. of Observations    2408    2408    2408     2408     2408 
No. of PFAs      43      43      43       43       43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Post-period defined as starting from January 2012, i.e., the earliest date of adoption of 
Operation Tornado. Treatment group (T = 1) defined as police forces of Cleveland, Durham, 
Northumbria, Humberside, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Norfolk, 
Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Cheshire, 
Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire, Merseyside, Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, 
Hertfordshire, Suffolk, Hampshire, Kent, Surrey, Sussex, Thames Valley, Avon and Somerset, 
Devon and Cornwall, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire. Comparison group (T = 0) defined as 
Dyfed-Powys, Gwent, North Wales, South Wales, Staffordshire, Warwickshire, West Mercia, 
West Midlands, Metropolitan Police Service and City of London. Metal theft defined as total 
monthly counts of metal thefts per 10,000 population at the police force area level. Regressions 
weighted by population at the police force area level. Newey-West standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. *** Difference-in-Differences statistically significant at the 1 percent level. ** 
Difference-in-Differences statistically significant at the 5 percent level. * Difference-in-
Differences statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 6. Difference-in-Differences Before and After the SMDA 2013. 
 
 Scrap Metal 
Dealers 
 
(treatment group) 
Other firms involved in 
collection, recovery and 
wholesale of other waste 
(control group) 
Treatment – 
Control  
Firms  
Unconditional 
DiD 
Estimate 
 (1) (2) (3) =  
(1) – (2) 
(4) 
     
A. Turnover (Log)     
     
Pre-Period  9.943                 9.823     0.120           DiD = 
Post-Period  9.812                 9.882    -0.070 -0.190*** 
Post - Pre -0.131                 0.059  
 
(0.057) 
Number of Firms 31 307             
     
B. Turnover per Employee (Log)     
     
Pre-Period  6.370                 6.199     0.171            DiD = 
Post-Period  6.159                 6.148     0.011 -0.160*** 
Post - Pre -0.211                -0.051  (0.053) 
Number of Firms 26 255           
     
C. EBITDA Margin     
     
Pre-Period  0.048                 0.063    -0.015           DiD = 
Post-Period  0.016                 0.055    -0.039 -0.024** 
Post - Pre -0.032                -0.008  
 
(0.010) 
Number of Firms 30 258             
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Table 6 shows the results of an unconditional difference-in-differences exercise comparing our outcomes of interest 
before and after the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013 in scrap metal dealers and control group firms. Post-period defined as 
starting from the fiscal year 2014. Treatment group (T = 1) defined as scrap metal dealers. Comparison group (T = 0) 
defined as pawnshops and all other businesses involved in the collection of non-hazardous waste, recovery of sorted 
materials, wholesale of metals and metal ores and wholesale of waste. Only firms that were still active at the time of 
writing, i.e., early 2018, and for which complete data was available from 2010 to 2015 were included in the analysis. Panel 
A shows the result of this exercise for Turnover (Log). Panel B shows the result of this exercise for Turnover per Employee 
(Log). Panel C shows the result of this exercise for EBITDA Margin. EBITDA Margin was calculated as Operating Profit 
/ Turnover. Turnover includes both national and international turnover. Operating Profit equals Gross Profit - 
Administration Expenses + Other Operating Income/Costs pre OP + Exceptional Items pre OP. Newey West standard 
errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance 
at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent. 
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Table 7. OLS Estimates of Impact of SMDA 2013 on the Economic Activity of Scrap Metal Dealers in England and Wales, 
2010 – 2015. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  
Turnover  
(Log) 
Dependent Variable:  
Turnover / Number of Employees  
(Log) 
Dependent Variable:  
EBITDA Margin 
(Operating Profit / Turnover) 
      (a)      (b)     (c)    (d)     (e)     (f)     (g)      (h)      (i) 
          
SMD x Post -0.190***    
(0.057) 
-0.190***    
(0.057)
-0.217***    
(0.050)
-0.159***    
(0.053)
-0.159***    
(0.053) 
-0.180***    
(0.050)
-0.023**    
(0.010)
-0.023**    
(0.010)
-0.027**    
(0.011)
          
Mean Dep. Var. Pre  9.834  9.834  10.146   6.215  6.215  6.195  0.062  0.062  0.060 
Year FE     No     Yes     Yes      No     Yes     Yes      No     Yes     Yes 
Firm FE     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
          
No. of Observations    2028    2028    1506    1686    1686    1506   1728   1728    1506 
No. of Firms     338     338     251     281     281     251    288    288     251 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Post-period defined as starting from the fiscal year 2014. Treatment group (T = 1) defined as scrap metal dealers. Comparison group (T = 0) defined as 
pawnshops and all other businesses involved in the collection of non-hazardous waste, recovery of sorted materials, wholesale of metals and metal ores and wholesale 
of waste. Only firms that were still active at the time of writing, i.e., early 2018, and for which complete data was available from 2010 to 2015 were included in the 
analysis. Turnover includes both national and international turnover. Operating Profit equals Gross Profit - Administration Expenses + Other Operating Income/Costs 
pre OP + Exceptional Items pre OP. Newey-West standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. *** Difference-in-Differences statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. ** Difference-in-Differences statistically significant at the 5 percent level. * Difference-in-Differences statistically significant at the 
10 percent level. 
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Table 8. Event-Study Estimates of Impact of SMDA 2013 on the Economic Activity of Scrap 
Metal Dealers in England and Wales, 2010 – 2015. 
 
Dependent Variable: Turnover 
(Log) 
Turnover /   Number of  
Employees 
(Log) 
EBITDA Margin 
(Operating Profit / Turnover) 
      (a)      (b)      (c)      (d)     (e)     (f) 
       
SMD x Pre 2 0.081    
(0.053) 
0.081    
(0.053)
0.033    
(0.056)
0.033    
(0.056)
-0.010    
(0.007) 
-0.010    
(0.007)
SMD x Pre 1 -0.045    
(0.063) 
-0.045    
(0.063)
-0.065    
(0.057)
-0.065    
(0.057)
-0.015    
(0.012) 
-0.015    
(0.012)
SMD x Post -0.181**    
(0.074) 
 -0.167**    
(0.068) 
 -0.030***    
(0.011) 
 
SMD x Post 1  -0.106*    
(0.064)
 -0.111    
(0.068)
 -0.024**    
(0.011)
SMD x Post 2  -0.255***    
(0.095)
 -0.222***    
(0.079)
 -0.035**    
(0.015)
       
Mean Dep. Var. Pre 9.779 9.779   6.204 6.204  0.070 0.070 
Year FE     Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes 
Firm FE     Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes 
       
No. of Observations    2028    2028    1686    1686   1728   1728 
No. of Firms     338     338     281     281    288    288 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Post-period defined as starting from the fiscal year 2014. Treatment group (T = 1) defined as scrap metal dealers. 
Comparison group (T = 0) defined as pawnshops and all other businesses involved in the collection of non-hazardous 
waste, recovery of sorted materials, wholesale of metals and metal ores and wholesale of waste. Only firms that were 
still active at the time of writing, i.e., early 2018, and for which complete data was available from 2010 to 2015 were 
included in the analysis. Turnover includes both national and international turnover. Operating Profit equals Gross Profit 
- Administration Expenses + Other Operating Income/Costs pre OP + Exceptional Items pre OP. Newey-West standard 
errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. *** Difference-in-Differences statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. ** Difference-in-Differences statistically significant at the 5 percent level. * Difference-in-
Differences statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Figure A1. Citations of Metal Theft and Metal Crime in UK National Newspapers  
From 2007 to 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Citations of metal theft and metal crime for every year were calculated using 
LexisNexis (www.nexis.com) from January 2007 to December 2017.
